In proxy re-encryption schemes, a semi-trusted entity called proxy can convert a ciphertext encrypted for Alice into a new ciphertext for Bob without seeing the underlying plaintext. Several proxy re-encryption schemes have been proposed, however, only one scheme which enables the conversion of IBE ciphertexts to PKE ciphertexts has been proposed and it has some drawbacks. In that scheme, the size of the re-encrypted ciphertext increases and Bob must be aware of existence of the proxy, which means Bob cannot decrypt a re-encrypted ciphertext with same PKE decryption algorithm. We propose a new, efficient scheme that enables the conversion of IBE ciphertexts to PKE ciphertexts, and prove CPA security in the standard model. In our scheme, the size of the re-encrypted ciphertext is optimal and Bob does not aware of existence of the proxy. As far as we knows, this is the first IBE-PKE type scheme that holds the above properties.
INTRODUCTION
In proxy re-encryption schemes, a semi-trusted entity called proxy can convert a ciphertext encrypted for Alice into a new ciphertext, which another user Bob can decrypt with his own secret information without revealing the underlying plaintext. The proxy is not fully trusted, i.e., the proxy cannot reveal Alice's or Bob's secret key, and can not learn the plaintext during the conversion.
There are many useful applications of these schemes. For instance, Alice can securely forward encrypted e-mails to Bob in her absence.
The proxy converts the messages which encrypted under the email address alice@foo.com into another ciphertexts encrypted under bob@foo.com. The proxy does not learn the content of the messages during conversion and Alice can forward message without revealing her secret key.
Several proxy re-encryption schemes have been proposed in the context of public key encryption (PKE), e.g., ElGamal or RSA. Other schemes have been proposed in the context of Identity Based Encryption (IBE) which the sender encrypts a plaintext using arbitral strings that represents the recipient's identity as the public key. The IBE has proven useful in solving public key-distribution issues of traditional certificate based PKE schemes.
Matsuo proposed two proxy re-encryption schemes.
The former one enables conversion between IBE users and the latter one enable the conversion of PKE ciphertexts to IBE ciphertexts in (T. Matsuo, 2007) .
The latter one called hybrid scheme can be useful in PKE and IBE mixed environments. Matsuo also classify proxy re-encryption schemes as follows:
1. The size of the re-encrypted ciphertext increases as compared to that of the original ciphertext.
2. The decryption algorithm of the re-encrypted ciphertext is different from the original decryption of the PKE scheme.
[IBE-IBE] type and [PKE-PKE] type of proxy re-encryption schemes have been proposed without such drawbacks. One of the theoretical interests is to construct the [IBE-PKE]-type proxy re-encryption scheme which does not have such drawbacks.
Entities of Proxy Re-Encryption
Generally, proxy re-encryption schemes have the following entities.
Sender. This entity encrypts plaintexts using a delegator's public key.
Delegator. This entity possesses the secret key corresponding to the public key used by the sender, and delegates decryption rights.
Delegatee. The decryption rights delegates to this entity from the delegator. The delegatee can decrypt re-encrypted ciphertexts own secret key, and without the delegator's secret key.
Proxy. This semi-trusted entity re-encrypts ciphertexts with a re-encryption keys, and outputs the ciphertexts, which the delegatee can decrypt using his own secret key without revealing underlying the plaintexts. 
Security of Proxy Re-Encryption
With regard to the security of proxy re-encryption schemes Green and Ateniese pointed out the previous schemes achieve a security only for chosen plaintext attacks (CPA), and also proposed a new scheme achieves chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) security in (M. Green and G.Ateniese, 2007 ). Green and Ateniese described that in the previous schemes, proxy cannot verify ciphertexts and grant adversaries invalid re-encryption. Hence, malicious delegatee can use a re-encryption oracle as a decryption oracle. Furthermore they proposed CCA-secure scheme with random oracle model using Canetti, Halevi and Kats (CHK) (R. Canetti et al., 2004) technique, which enables the proxy to validate ciphertexts.
After Green and Ateniese pointed out the security problems with the previous schemes, Canetti and Hohenberger proposed CCA-secure [PKE-PKE]-type Re-Encryption scheme in the standard model (R. Canetti and S.Hohenberger, 2007) .
In this paper, we propose a new [IBE-PKE]-type scheme, which achieves CPA-security only. However it might be possible achieve CCA-security using Green and Ateniese technique in (M. Green and G.Ateniese, 2007) .
Our Contribution
We propose the first [IBE-PKE]-type proxy reencryption scheme, which holds the following advantages simultaneously.
• Our scheme achieves optimal ciphetext size. The size of a re-encrypted ciphertext is same as a PKE ciphertext, while (M. Green and G.Ateniese, 2007) [IBE-PKE]-type scheme requires additional elements of ciphertext to support reencryption.
• Our scheme achives proxy invisibility which means delegatee does not require additional algorithm for decryption of a re-encrypted ciphertext. The delegatee can decrypt ciphertexts without being aware of the existence of the proxy, while it is required in (M. Green and G.Ateniese, 2007 
Organisation
The rest of paper consists of 4 sections. In Sec. 2 gives some definitions and preliminaries. In Sec. 3 we define security of IBE-PKE type proxy re-encryption. In Sec. 4 we present the IBE-PKE type proxy reencryption scheme, and finally conclude this study in Sec. 5.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, We describe the settings and computational assumptions used in this paper. We then define an [IBE-PKE]-type proxy re-encryption scheme and its security.
Bilinear Groups
Let G and G 1 be the two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, and g be a generator of G. We say that G 1 has an admissible bilinear mapê : G × G → G 1 if the following conditions hold.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed efficiently and there exists a group G 1 and an efficiently computable bilinear mapê as above.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption (dBDH)
The dBDH problem (D. Boneh and X.Boyen, 2004) in G as follows: Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p with an efficiently computable pairingê :
Let k be a security parameter of suffcient size, we define the advantage of an algorithm A as follows:
where the probability is taken over the random choice of the generator g,the random choice of a, b, c in Z * p , the random choice of T in G 1 , and the random bits consumed by A . We say that (k,t, ε)-dBDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage Adv dBDH A < ε G under security parameter k.
Identity Based Encryption Scheme
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) consists of the following algorithm.
SetUp IBE (k). Given a security parameter k as input, a trusted entity Private Key Generator (PKG) generates a master key mk and public parameters params, and outputs mk and params.
KeyGen IBE (mk, params, ID). For inputs of a master key mk, public parameters params, and an identity ID, the PKG outputs a IBE secret key sk ID corresponding to the identity. 
Enc IBE (ID, params, M). For inputs of an identity

Public Key Encryption Scheme
Public Key Encryption (PKE) consists from following algorithms.
KeyGen PKE (k, params). Given a security parameter k and IBE public parameters params as input, outputs PKE key pair SK, PK where SK is a secret key, PK is the corresponding public key PK.
Enc PKE (PK, M, params). For inputs of a public key PK and plaintext M, IBE public parameters params, outputs the PKE ciphertext C PKE .
Dec PKE (SK, C PKE , params). For inputs a secret key sk, PKE ciphertext C PKE , and IBE public para metes params, decrypts and outputs a plaintext M.
IBE-PKE Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
[IBE-PKE]-type proxy re-encryption (IBE-PKE-PRE) consists of the following algorithm KeyGen PRO (mk, ID, PK, PK R , params). For inputs of a master key mk, a delegator's identity ID, delegatee's PKE public key PK and public key for Re-Encryption PK R , and IBE public parameters 
CHOSEN PLAINTEXT SECURITY FOR IBE-PKE PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION
We define chosen plaintext security for the [IBE-PKE]-type scheme according to the following game between an adversary A and a challenger C . We define two types of attacks, an adversary attacks against the IBE scheme and another against the PKE scheme. Hence, in the following game, we define an adversary attacks against the IBE scheme as (TY PE = IBE) and an adversary attacks against the PKE as (TY PE = PKE). We design the following game on the basis of Boneh and Boyen's selective ID secure IBE game (D. Boneh and X.Boyen, 2004 ) and Green and Ateniese's proxy re-encryption game (M. Green and G.Ateniese, 2007) . We show even if an adversary obtains additional informations related to proxy reencryption, such as re-encryption keys, it does not make the underlying IBE or PKE schemes weak.
In the following game, the adversary is allowed to adaptively conduct IBE secret key queries, PKE secret key queries and re-encryption key queries. These queries imply the following situation that: The adversary corrupts IBE users to obtain their IBE secret keys, corrupts PKE users to obtain their PKE secret keys and corrupts the proxy to obtain re-encryption keys. We classify PKE users under two party, honest party and corrupted party by adversary. The adversary can obtain a PKE secret key of a corrupted party, but restricted to get re-encryption keys which can convert an IBE ciphertext corresponding to target identity to a PKE ciphertext for the corrupted party, because the adversary obviously wins the game. The adversary also restricted to obtain a PKE secret key of a honest party, but does not restricted to get reencryption keys which can convert an IBE ciphertext to a PKE ciphertext for the honest party. Besides the above game, during Phase 1 and Phase 2, A restricts the following queries which A can decrypt a challenge ciphertext only using C 's answers.
If (TY PE = IBE), the following queries are restricted.
• Extract IBE (ID * ), where ID * is the challenge identity.
• Extract PKE (PKE j ), where PKE j is a honest party's identity.
• Extract IBE→PKE (ID * , PKE j ), where ID * is the challenge identity and PKE j is a corrupted party's PKE user identity.
If (TY PE = PKE), the following queries are restricted.
• Extract PKE (PKE j ), where PKE j is a honest party's PKE user identity. 
EFFICIENT IBE-PKE TYPE PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION
BB-IBE Scheme
SetUp IBE (k). Given security parameter k as input, let G, G 1 be a bilinear group of prime order p. Letê : G × G → G 1 be the bilinear map. Select a random generator g ∈ G and random elements h, g 2 ∈ G. Pick a random element α ∈ Z * p and set g 1 = g α ,mk = α and set params = g, g 1 , g 2 , h . Let mk be a master secret key, and params be the public parameters. (mk, params, ID) . Given master secret key mk = α, public parameters params and an identity ID as input, the PKG picks a random element u ∈ Z * p and outputs an IBE secret key sk ID .
KeyGen IBE
sk ID = d 1 , d 2 = g α 2 g ID 1 h u , g u
Enc IBE (ID, params, M).
Given an identity ID, public parameter params and plaintext M ∈ G 1 as input, select a random element r ∈ Z * p and output an IBE ciphertext C IBE .
Dec IBE (sk ID , params, C IBE ). Given an IBE secret key sk ID , public parameters params and an IBE ciphertext C IBE as input, output a plaintext M.
PKE Scheme
KeyGen PKE (k, params). Given security parameter k and BB-IBE public parameters params as input, select a random element x ∈ R Z * p and set SK = x, PK = g x , output SK as a PKE secret key and PK as a PKE public key. If PKE user accepts delegation, PKE user also publish public key for re-encryption PK R = g 1/SK 2 . If PKE user does not wish to accept delegation, PKE user does not publish public key for reencryption value.
Enc PKE (PK, M, params). Given a PKE public key
PK, a plaintext M ∈ G 1 and BB-IBE public parameters params as input, pick a random element v ∈ Z * p and output a PKE ciphertext C PKE = X,Y . 
Extract
). If v 1 = v 2 then output ⊥ and halt. Note that, correct input values can transform as follow:
Compute C PKE and output it.
The delegatee can decrypt this re-encrypt resultC PKE using his own secret key SK with same PKE decryption algorithm Dec PKE (SK, C PKE , params). 
Security of IBE-PKE-PRE
where l denotes the number of PKE users, and sets the PKE public key and secret key as follows:
• If the PKE user PKE j is a corrupted party by A IBE , sets the PKE public key as PK j = g x j , the PKE public key for re-encryption as PK R j = Γ 1/x j 2 and the secret key as SK j = x j .
B IBE stores PKE j , PK j , PK R j , SK j to PPKL and PSKL, and sets the mark as corrupted.
• If the PKE user PKE j is a honest party, sets the PKE public key as PK j = Γ x j 2 , the PKE public key for re-encryption as PK R j = g 1/x j . Under this condition, PKE secret key value is SK j = bx j where B IBE cannot compute, however B IBE can reject the query of this value. B IBE stores the secret key as SK j = x j as a substitute for computing re-encryption key values. 
B does not abort during the above simulation.
In the above simulation, maximum computation cost of the queries is at most polynomial time exponentiation, hence t ′ < t − Θ(τq). Therefor, the IBE-PKE-PRE is (k,t ′ , q, ε)-IND-sPr-CPA secure against against an (TY PE = IBE) adversary. (G, G 1 ) . Then, the IBE-PKE-PRE is (k,t ′ , q, ε)-IND-sPr-CPA secure against a (TY PE = PKE) adversary for any (q, k, ε) and t ′ < t − Θ(τq) where τ denotes a maximum time for exponentiation in G, G 1 .
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that the (k,t, ε)-dBDH assumption holds in
Proof. Let A PKE be a t-time (TY PE = PKE) adversary against the IBE-PKE-PRE. We construct an adversary B PKE which can solve dBDH problem in G, by using A PKE . The B PKE is given an input 
In the above simulation, maximum computation cost of the queries is at most polynomial time exponentiation, hence t ′ < t − Θ(τq). Therefor, the IBE-PKE-PRE is (k,t ′ , q, ε)-IND-sPr-CPA secure against against an (TY PE = PKE) adversary. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a efficient [IBE-PKE]-type proxy re-encryption scheme which the size of the reencrypted ciphertext is optimal and delegatee does not aware of existence of the proxy. We define the security notation and prove selective-ID secure based on dBDH assumption in the standard model against chosen plaintext attack. Furthermore our scheme might be possible to extend full-ID secure using IBE proposed in (B.Waters, 2005) .
Green and Ateniese (M. Green and G.Ateniese, 2007) proposed the semantically secure IdentityBased proxy re-encryption scheme and constructed CCA-secure scheme applying CHK conversion technique (R. Canetti et al., 2004) to their CPA-secure scheme. It might be able to construct the CCA-secure [IBE-PKE]-type proxy re-encryption scheme by using same technique to our CPA-secure scheme. It will be appeared in the full version.
